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Marco Mantovani (University of Milan – Bicocca)
When : May 27 (11.00 -12.00)
Room : P02
Moral Preferences over Taboo Trade-offs in the Time of Coronavirus. Authors: Antonio Filippin, Marco Mantovani
Abstract: Covid-19 brought to the forefront of the political agenda the trade-off between health and economic activities. Leveraging theoretical and empirical tools from economics we estimate moral preferences over fatalities and jobs losses due to the pandemic in Italy, the UK and the US. The exercise allows to characterize those preferences not in a specific situation, but for any point in the space of possible combinations of the two outcomes. This allows to estimate how people respond to the severity of the economic and/or health toll. We find health weights more than economic activity, and respondents’ stable traits (such as political orientation or risk aversion) influence attitudes more than their personal experiences with the consequences of the pandemic. Most importantly, policy responses look misaligned with estimated preferences. Italy adopted more stringent containment measures, while Italian respondents display a relatively weaker pro-health attitude. We stress-test this result and find it is robust: it does not stem either from a reaction to the policies adopted or from differences in fundamentals, such as labor market conditions and health costs.
CAPE/CEREC : Malka Guillot (ULIEGE)
When : June 10 (11.00 – 12.00)
Room : P02
« Is Charitable Giving Political? Evidence from Wealth and Income Tax Returns ».
Is charitable giving politically motivated? Do the same people give to both charities and political parties, and do they substitute between one and other? In this article, we use novel administrative household panel data to quantify empirically the motivations for giving, depending on donors’ characteristics and tax incentives. Our dataset includes all the households filling their income tax and/or their wealth tax returns in France between 2006 and 2019. In France, both charitable and political donations benefit from income tax deductions, but only the charitable ones are eligible to the wealth-tax credit. To estimate the cross-price elasticity of charitable and political giving, we exploit a natural experiment: the 2018 wealth-tax reform – a change in the taxable base that led to a drop by two third in the number of liable households. Focusing on the households with similar wealth-tax gains following the reform and using a number of different empirical strategies, we provide new evidence of substituability between charitable and political donations: according to our estimates, a one-percent increase in the price of charitable giving leads to an increase of around 12% in political donations. Next, using novel hand-collected data on the annual donations received by public-utility nonprofit organizations combined with textual analysis, we estimate the extent to which charitable giving is political. Our findings have policy implications for the optimal regulation of tax incentives.
CAPE/CEREC : Workshop on conflicts and development
When : June 16 (10.00-12.00)
Room : P02
Jean-François Maystadt (Université Catholique De Louvain). « Refugees, Diversity And Conflict In Sub-Saharan Africa ». Joint With Luisito Bertinelli (University Of Luxembourg), Rana Comertpay (University Of Luxembourg).
This paper investigates how changes in diversity induced by the annual inflows of refugees at the local level affect conflict across 23 countries in sub-Saharan Africa between 2005 and 2016. Refugee-induced polarization is found to exacerbate the risk of violence at the local and individual levels. The opposite is found for refugee-induced fractionalization. The results should not be interpreted as evidence that refugees per se impact the likelihood of violence. We found a negative correlation between the number of refugees and violence. Instead, the analysis points to the risk of conflict when refugees exacerbate ethnic polarization in the hosting communities.
Pétros Sekeris (Montpellier Business School). Theoretical Foundations of the Modernization Hypothesis. Authors : D. Debowicz , A. Dickson, I. MacKenzie, P. Sekeris
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework where citizens derive utility from both material goods, and political liberties, with the two arguments of the util- ity function potentially exhibiting complementarities to the extent that wealth can never perfectly substitute the lack of political liberties and representation. Goods are produced endogenously, with the opportunity cost of production being the marginal improvement of political freedom that would obtain from political activism. The rul- ing elites aim at minimizing the degree of political freedom so as to increase their like- lihood of retaining power. We demonstrate that economic development as captured by positive productivity shocks, incentivizes citizens to substitute production time for political activism in developed economies, thus bringing support to the moderniza- tion hypothesis. In economically backwards polities, we demonstrate that negative economic shocks will increase political activism, in support of theories discrediting the modernization hypothesis. Empirical tests are shown to support our theoretical findings.
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